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Since a key function of competitive elections is to allow voters to express their policy 
preferences, one might take it for granted that when leadership changes, policy change 
follows. Using a dataset we created on the composition of central government expenditures 
in a panel of 71 democracies over 1972-2003, we test whether changes in leadership induce 
significant changes in one measure of policy - spending composition - as well as looking at 
the effect of other political and economic variables. We find that the replacement of a 
leader tends to have no significant effect on expenditure composition in the short-run. This 
remains true after controlling for a host of political and economic variables. However, over 
the medium-term leadership changes are associated with larger changes in expenditure 
composition, mostly in developed countries. We also find that in established democracies, 
election years are associated with larger changes in expenditure composition while new 
democracies, which were found by Brender and Drazen (2005) to raise their overall level 
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1. Introduction 
A central function of competitive elections is to allow voters to express their policy 
preferences. One might therefore expect that when elections result in leadership changes, policy 
change follows. But, does it? And if so, how quickly? 
In this paper we examine this question by looking at how the composition of government 
spending responds to political variables such as changes in leadership or elections. There are 
many other aspects of policy, and we make no claim that our results easily generalize to other 
measures of policy. But expenditure composition is clearly an important aspect of government 
policy – candidates and parties differentiate themselves by how they would prioritize 
expenditures if elected, and many campaign issues are related to expenditure composition. 
Hence, it is worthwhile examining expenditure composition in and of itself, to see whether 
elections and leadership changes matter at all for expenditure allocation. Moreover, changes in 
the composition of government spending may well be representative of policy change in general. 
Whether leadership changes result in changes in the composition of government 
expenditure is an empirical question that cannot be determined by theory alone. (See section 3 
below.) Though anecdotal evidence may be used to support a position in one direction or the 
other, it is no substitute for formal empirical evidence. However, as we discuss below, the 
evidence on this question is scarce and mixed. As far as we know, it only covers OECD 
countries. 
The question of whether leadership change results in changes in the composition of 
expenditure really has two parts: do elected leaders want to change the composition of spending, 
as they state in their campaigns?; and, can they do so if they in fact want to? We do not 
distinguish between the two here, but simply ask whether in fact leadership changes induce 
changes in the composition of spending. To study the effect of this and other political variables 
on expenditure composition, we compiled data for a panel of 71 democracies
1 over 1972-2003 
and constructed an index of changes in the composition of central government expenditures 
based on these data. We find several economic and political variables that are associated with 
expenditure changes but that the replacement of a leader has no statistically significant effect on 
expenditure composition in the first two years relative to a leader not having been replaced. In 
                                                            
1 Given our interest in elections, we focus on democracies. Constraints on and motivations of leaders in dictatorships 
are different, and we think the subject of a different paper.  2 
 
contrast, leadership changes do result in greater composition change over a four-year period, 
predominantly in developed countries. We further find that in established democracies (but not 
in new democracies) election years are associated with larger changes in expenditure 
composition than other years. This may be seen as the flip side of our earlier results (Brender and 
Drazen, 2005, 2008) that election-year changes in the level of expenditures and of deficits 
characterize new democracies but not established democracies, where they are generally 
punished. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we consider existing empirical 
studies of the relation between ideology and expenditure composition, related to our interest in 
the effect of leadership change on changes in budget composition. In section 3 we argue that 
economic theory gives no clear answer as to whether changes in leadership will result in changes 
in expenditure composition, so that the question is an empirical one. In section 4 we set out our 
empirical methodology, followed by our empirical results on the effect of leader characteristics 
on expenditure composition in the short-run in section 5. In section 6, we look at longer-run 
relationships, where we do find an effect of leadership change on changes in expenditure 
composition. Section 7 considers election-year effects, where we see that in established 
democracies, but not in new ones, election years are associated with larger changes in 
expenditure composition than non-election years. In the final section we summarize our findings 
and present conclusions. An appendix provides detailed information about the derivation of our 
variables.  
2. Existing Empirical Studies  
2.1 Leadership changes 
What is the evidence on the relation between changes in leadership and subsequent changes 
in expenditure composition?
2 The literature that exists has largely focused on a related question, 
the relation between ideology and expenditure composition.
3 Budge and Hofferbert (1990) 
examine the relation between U.S. party programs and federal government expenditures, where 
                                                            
2 We mean expenditure composition across detailed rather than broad categories. Persson and Tabellini (2004) 
consider the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on the ratio of central government social security and 
welfare compared to other government outlays. In section 5.3 below we report on the effect of government and 
electoral rules on how detailed composition of government spending changes over time.  
3 An exception is Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) who find significant leader gender effects in village councils in 
India. 3 
 
they argue that a party is bound (both morally and by fears of retribution at the next election) to 
carry through the program on which it has been elected (p. 111). Using an analysis of what the 
party emphasizes in its platform to construct a numerical measure of a party's policy in a given 
area,
4 they conclude that there is significant evidence that parties do enact policies on which they 
are elected. King, et al. (1993) argue however that their strong results arise from a failure to 
correct for autocorrelation and exhibit Granger-Newbold spurious correlation. Once a correction 
is made, King, et al. argue that the Budge-Hofferbert data do not support their assertions of a 
strong relation between platforms and policy outcomes, and that the lack of relation reflects the 
fact that American parties are more diffuse, porous, and less programmatic than those in most 
other countries (p. 744). The bottom line for the U.S. is that budgets' allocations almost always 
change incrementally (p.747). 
Tsebelis and Chang (2004) argue that in a sample of 19 OECD countries
5 over 1973-95, 
changes in government composition do affect budget composition. They consider the average 
budget distance over 9 categories with a similar measure to ours below
6 and relate it to measures 
of the ideological distance between parties in the government as well as the alternation of 
ideological position from one government to the next. They find that the change in the budget 
composition is related negatively to the ideological distance between parties in the current 
government and positively to the ideological differences between the current government and the 
previous year's governments. As they put it, the budgetary structure tends to lock itself into the 
existing pattern in political systems with ideologically distant veto players; in contrast, the 
budgetary structure tends to be more flexible in political systems with ideologically similar veto 
players. (p. 470) 
Bräuninger (2005) considers the ratio of social security expenditure to the aggregate 
expenditure on social security and economic affairs. He finds that higher weight on social 
welfare spending in a party's policy manifestos does lead to a significant increase in social 
security spending. A change in the position of the median legislator has an effect in the correct 
direction, but is less significant statistically. A change in the ideological composition of the 
                                                            
4 Specifically, following Budge, Robertson, and Hearl (1987), they take the percent of sentences in the ruling 
parties' platform related to each expenditure category. 
5 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 4 
 
legislature  towards  more  left-wing  parties  had  no  statistically  significant  effect  on  social 
spending. 
All these papers consider the relation between aspects of a government's ideology and the 
composition of expenditure, which is clearly related to the issues we are considering. However, 
none of them looks specifically at a change in leadership per se and how it affects the 
composition of spending. Additionally, these papers do not examine changes in expenditure 
composition in the medium-term. 
The paper that is probably most closely related to ours is Jones and Olken (2005), who 
consider how deaths of leaders while in office are associated with economic performance and 
government policy. They find that such plausibly exogenous leadership transitions matter for 
growth of real GDP per capita in a country and are strongest in non-democracies, where they 
argue that there are fewer constraints on a leader's power. More relevant for our question, they 
also look at changes in the growth rate of government expenditure following a leadership 
change. The results they present show no significant effect of a leader's death on expenditure 
growth (though they mention that alternative tests do show an effect). They conclude that there is 
no strong evidence of fiscal policy effects. Our results may be seen as pushing this further, since 
we consider not only replacement due to death, but also replacement in elections, where it is 
more likely to find policy changes – and we still find no short-term effect. 
 
2.2 Election-year effects  
There has been a significant amount of work on the effect of elections on aggregate fiscal 
variables (political budget cycles) at the national level. In Brender and Drazen (2005), where 
much of the literature is summarized, we found that the existence of a political deficit cycle 
identified in many studies is driven by the experience of new democracies
7:  the strong political 
budget cycle in these countries accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger samples that 
include these countries and disappears when these countries are removed from larger samples. 
That is, increased deficits and expenditures in election years are a phenomenon of new 
democracies and are not statistically significant in developed countries or established 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
6 They use Euclidean distance     
½ 2
9 , 1 9 ,
2
1 , 1 1 ,         it it it it it E E E E E   rather than absolute value as we do.  
7 These are countries that became democracies after 1960 (when our sample in that paper started) with the country 
being classified as a new democracy in the years up to (and including) the fourth election after the transition to 
democracy.  5 
 
democracies as a group. The findings in Brender and Drazen (2008) suggest why this may be the 
case – election-year deficits or increases in overall expenditure significantly decrease the 
probability of reelection in established democracies and developed countries as a group, but have 
no statistically significant effect in developing countries or new democracies in either direction. 
Hence, election-year deficits and expenditure increases may not be observed in established 
democracies because they are not an effective election-year tool. 
Election-year effects on the composition of spending have been investigated primarily at 
the sub-national level (see Drazen and Eslava [2009] for a summary and empirical study of 
Colombia), with a number of papers finding that in specific countries at the sub-national level, 
investment or infrastructure spending rises in election years relative to other categories of 
spending.
8 (Drazen and Eslava (2009) find further that this composition shift increases an 
incumbent's reelection probabilities.) Vergne (2009) looks at composition of expenditure at the 
national level in a sample of developing countries and finds that, in contrast to the studies just 
mentioned, the share of current (rather than capital) expenditure tends to rise in election years. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no other large panel study of election-year effects on the 
composition of government expenditure at the central government level and none at all including 
developed countries.   
 
3. The Effect of Leadership in Theory  
The choices of optimizing agents should reflect their preferences. The same should apply to 
government leaders (as, e.g., is central to the predictions of citizen-candidate models of Osborne 
and Slivinski [1996] and Besley and Coate [1997]). Hence, basic theory would lead one to 
expect that a change in the policy preferences of a policymaker would be reflected in changes in 
the actual composition of expenditures. Accordingly, a change in the political party controlling 
the executive or legislative branch of government would be thought to lead to a change in the 
                                                            
8 Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) find no evidence of a political cycle in aggregate spending for Canadian 
provinces, but do find a cycle in what they call visible expenditures, mostly investment expenditures such as 
construction of roads and structures. For Mexico, Gonzalez (2002) finds similarly that investment expenditure 
expands prior to elections, while some other categories of spending, such as current transfers, contract. Brender 
(2003) finds that voters in local elections in Israel reward high expenditure in development projects - controlling for 
the size of the deficit - in the year previous to an election. Similarly, Khemani (2004) finds that Indian states spend 
more on public investment before scheduled elections than in other times, while they contract current spending, 6 
 
composition of spending. Even without a change in party, new leaders come in with their own 
spending priorities and would likely change the composition of spending. 
However, there are several, not mutually exclusive, reasons why leadership change might 
not lead to rapid policy change. First, policy changes take time. Much government expenditure is 
mandated by law (such as entitlements) or by past government decisions and can be changed 
only gradually. Lags in the budget approval process imply that expenditure composition – or at 
least its broad outlines – in the early part of a new leader's term are determined before he or she 
takes office.
9 Even when there are no legal constraints in changing policy, new officeholders 
may face a learning curve in how to achieve their aims. This suggests that leadership changes 
would induce changes in expenditure composition, but with a lag, a possibility we investigate 
empirically.  
Second, the need to get elected means that leaders may need to commit, at least partially, to 
policies that reflect median-voter preferences, so that differences in enacted policies may be 
smaller than underlying ideological differences between leaders may suggest. The basic 
Downsian model of purely office-motivated candidates who can commit to policy platforms 
implies that under certain conditions the policy platforms of both candidates in a two-candidate 
race will converge to the policy preferred by the median voter. Though the predictions of the 
simple Downsian model are considered often unrealistic, other models may also yield analogous 
results. (For example, the citizen-candidate model implies that if there is a policy that is a 
Condorcet winner, the candidate who would implement this policy is the one elected.) The main 
point is that if policy preferences of the electorate are fairly stable over time, the policy enacted 
by elected leaders will be similarly stable, though the leader's identity may change. 
Third, an elected leader is not a unitary policymaker. In making policy, she must work with 
other political actors – legislators, special interest groups, and the existing bureaucracy – whose 
identities and interests do not necessarily change when a new leader is elected (Bräuninger, 
2002). The composition of the legislature often shows relatively little change from election to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
leaving the overall balance unchanged. Drazen and Eslava (2009) find a similar increase in infrastructure spending 
in Colombian municipal elections in election years, but no increase in aggregate spending. 
9 Tsebelis and Chang (2004) focus on short-term changes because they argue that in OECD countries new 
governments can change the expenditure composition, as there are numerous ways in many of these countries to 
alter the existing budget. In contrast, the country chapters in Hallerberg et al. (2009) highlight the formal and 
informal rigidities that limit leaders' ability to change the budget composition. 7 
 
election. The bureaucracy below the top rungs shows similar inertia. And, new leaders must 
bargain with entrenched special interests lobbying for the same issues they did with the previous 
political leadership, where being new on the job may imply relatively low bargaining power. 
(See Drazen and Limão [2008] where bargaining power with special interest groups may vary 
over policymakers.) Hence, to the extent that some powerful political actors remain in place 
when leaders are changed, policy may appear to have significant inertia. 
Conceptually, one may argue that there is a price to pay to change expenditure composition 
(which may be close to infinite on some issues at some points) which must be weighed against 
the gain. More precisely, the questions of whether a new leader wants to change expenditure and 
whether she is able to effect a change can be subsumed in the question: When does the benefit to 
the leader of changing expenditures exceed the cost she faces to do so? These costs may be quite 
high for a new leader except in special circumstances (such as Franklin Roosevelt's First 
“Hundred Days” after taking office in 1933). Leaders gain experience over time in how to 
achieve what they want. Moreover, as in the general theory of investment, rapid change may be 
especially costly, giving another reason why change may be observed only after some time in 
office. 
The value of holding office is one very tangible benefit to incumbents. Alesina et al. (1997 
suggest that “certain more visible and politically sensible programs may be more easily and 
productively manipulated than others,” and several models (Rogoff, 1990, Drazen and Eslava, 
2008, 2009) consider how incumbents may try to increase their probability of reelection by 
changing the composition of expenditure. This would be consistent with the desire to target some 
groups of voters before elections without increasing overall spending or deficits. These models 
assume that the incumbent running for reelection has complete control over fiscal policy, while 
the above discussion suggests changing policy may be difficult or costly. 
Significant change in election years may reflect several factors. Experience may reduce the 
cost of effecting change, while the electoral motive may imply a large perceived payoff. 
Moreover, shifting expenditures may be less visible than deficits and may also be perceived by 
voters as more sustainable, implying a lower political cost. In any country and period, the 
direction of change may be different, depending on the perception of current needs and voter 
distribution (e.g., who the median voter is and what dimensions are priorities in each particular 8 
 
case); this is why we look at a general index of change, which is independent of direction.  
The bottom line is that theory makes no unambiguous prediction about how much 
expenditure composition will change, if it changes at all, when a new leader takes office. This is 
true even if the new leader prefers an expenditure composition different than the status quo. 
Hence, the effect of leadership changes on expenditure composition becomes an empirical 
question.  
4. Description of Methodology  
4.1 Basic Sample 
Our sample consists of 71 democracies (as described in Appendix I) over the period 1972-
2003 for which we have data on the breakdown of central government expenditure. One reason 
that expenditure composition is not more studied is no doubt the problem of data availability, 
where detailed breakdown of expenditure into more than a few categories requires substantial 
work if one is to consider a broad set of countries over a long period. Hence, our first 
methodological step was simply creating such a data set. 
In constructing our indices of composition, we used two different breakdowns of 
expenditures, one using 9 categories of expenditures, the other using 12 categories, as detailed in 
the appendix. The 12-category breakdown has the advantage of allowing a more refined 
examination of changes but it comes with a cost of reducing the sample size. The effect of the 
availability of data for the various categories on the sample size is reported in Table 1. As we 
move from a one-year to a four-year window (see the next paragraph) the number of available 
observations falls, with developed countries and established democracies forming a greater 
proportion of the sample relative to less-developed countries and new democracies. (These are 
related, as most new democracies are less-developed countries). This has implications also for 
other categories – for example, most countries with a Presidential system are less developed.  
4.2 Construction of Index 
Our index is constructed as follows. Let i= country; j= expenditure category; t= date. We 
therefore have a vector of expenditure shares ej,i,t  in country i at t for j different categories of 
expenditure (where ej,i,t  is between 0 and 100 so that  100 , , 1  

 t i j
J j
j e ). An index of the change in 

















The data may also be used to construct an index of change over a period longer than one 
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which includes the previous equation when n=1. This index goes from 0 (in the case of no 
change in the share of expenditure in any category) to 100 (in the case of one category going 
from none to the entire expenditure in year t relative to the earlier year or years and another 
going from all to none). The index measures the change from any category to another, taking no 
stand on the direction of the change.
10 The means and standard deviations of the index for 
different country categories and horizons are shown in Table A-3 in the data appendix. 
Observations 1 year 2 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 4 years
Total 1010 912 705 867 779 603
Developed 551 510 423 455 427 362
Undeveloped 459 402 282 412 352 241
New Democracies 322 273 164 277 227 132
Established Democracies 688 639 541 590 552 471
Presidential 317 278 196 278 237 163
Parliamentary 693 634 509 589 542 440
Majoritarian 212 186 147 207 181 144
Proportional 798 726 558 660 598 459
1 For definitions of the country categories see the data appendix.
9 Expenditure Categories 12 Expenditure Categories




4.3 Measuring Political Effects 
Leadership changes 
Changes in the leadership of a country are examined using data from World Political 
Leaders 1945-2008 and from World Statesmen. In countries with a presidential system we focus 
on changes of presidency; in parliamentary ones on the prime minister (see the data appendix for 
                                                            
10 Unlike the Euclidean index used by Tsebelis and Chang (2004), this measure does not give a larger weight to 
larger changes in the shares of specific categories. See footnote 5.  10 
 
details). For each country in each year we check whether the head of state at the end of the fiscal 
year is the same as at the beginning of the year and distinguish between whether the leader was 
replaced in an election year or not. (In countries with a presidential system, we look at 
presidential elections; in parliamentary systems we look at parliamentary elections.) The 
distribution of our sample according to these criteria is reported in Table 2. In our largest sample 
– of expenditure composition changes over one year and using 9 expenditure categories – we 
have 254 observations in which the leader was replaced. Of those the leader was replaced in an 
elections year in 152 cases. When we move to observations for which we have data on the 12 
expenditure categories the number of leader replacements falls (along with the sample size) to 
210, of which 131 were replaced in election years. 
1 year in EY
2
2 years in EY
2
4 years in EY
2
Replaced Leader 254 152 230 138 178 110
No change in alignment 151 73 134 64 100 50
Change from Left to All 33 26 32 25 25 20
of which to Right 26 22 25 21 20 17
Change from Right to All 42 35 38 32 33 27
of which to Left 28 24 26 22 21 17
Change from Center or Undefined to all 28 18 26 17 20 13
1 year in EY
2
2 years in EY
2
4 years in EY
2
Replaced Leader 210 131 188 118 144 95
No change in alignment 118 60 104 53 74 41
Change from Left to All 29 24 27 22 25 20
of which to Right 23 20 21 18 20 17
Change from Right to All 38 32 34 29 29 24
of which to Left 26 23 24 21 19 16
Change from Center or Undefined to all 25 15 23 14 16 10
2 EY stands for election year.
9 Expenditure Categories
12 Expenditure Categories
1Relating to a change in the base year, e.g., in the 2 years category we report whether there had been a 
leadership change in t-2.




We also examine whether leadership changes were associated with a change in the leader's 
political alignment. Using data predominantly from the World Bank's DPI we classify all the 
leaders to four categories: Left, Center, Right and Undefined (see data appendix). We then look 
at whether the new leaders share the alignment of their predecessors or not. We find that in about 
60 percent of all cases there is no change in alignment and that sharp changes (from left to right 11 
 
and from right to left) are of similar magnitude to each other. However, among the cases where 
the leader was replaced in an election year the proportion of changes in alignment is more than 
50 percent.  
Political Strength 
A leader's political strength may have a substantial effect on his ability to carry out the 
changes he desires. Leaders who step into office enjoying strong popular support and a 
convenient parliamentary majority may be more able to carry out their desired and promised 
changes in spending priorities and to tackle entrenched interests. We distinguish between two 
forces: (1) the effect of political strength itself on changes in expenditure composition, (2) the 
interaction between political strength and leadership changes -- that is whether new leaders who 
enjoy strong support change expenditure composition more than ones with weaker support. To 
account for the political strength in presidential systems we examine the share of votes received 
by the president in the last elections; in parliamentary systems we examine the share of seats in 
parliament held by the leader's party.
11 In Section 5.3 below we discuss additional political 
factors that may affect leaders' political strength. 
4.4 Regressions 
To test for the effect of leadership changes -- both alone and in conjunction with other 
political variables --on changes in government expenditure composition we run a panel 
regression with country fixed effects: 
 t t t s s
s
t i cx b n I     , , z  
where  t z  is a vector of control variables--overall expenditure growth, GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, government size (relative to GDP), inflation, percent of population over 65; political 
characteristics of the country – which are discussed in greater detail in section 4.5 – and the 
initial shares of specific expenditure categories, as discussed below. xt is the leadership change 
measure we consider. Because the regressions for periods that extend beyond one year include 
overlapping observations, we use robust standard errors corrected both for serial correlation and 
                                                            
11 To allow for an intuitive interpretation of the coefficients both variables are standardized by subtracting their 
mean from each observation and dividing the score by their standard deviation. 12 
 
moving average using the Newey-West procedure.
 12  
Means and standard deviations of all the variables are reported in Table 3. The mean 
change in expenditure composition is 4.5% (5.1%) per year for 9 (12) expenditure categories. 
This rises by a factor of 1.7 (rather than four) as we move to a four-year window, suggesting that 
some changes are reversed over the longer horizon. Note further that the means of GDP per 
capita, average inflation and population over 65 decrease at the four- relative to the one- and 
two-year windows, reflecting the greater proportion of developed countries in the longer 
windows. In contrast, votes (for presidential systems), and leader’s party strength (for 
parliamentary systems) do not change significantly as we move from a one- to a four-year 
window, so that differences in results for the effect of leadership on changes in expenditure 
composition are not driven by these variables. 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
mean 4.473 6.317 7.747 7.926 5.144 7.105 8.577 8.754
stdev 3.890 4.778 5.764 5.030 4.352 5.185 6.089 5.431
Expenditure Growth 
2 mean 4.459 8.732 13.300 17.769 4.503 8.761 13.141 17.503
stdev 8.777 13.962 17.960 20.125 9.081 14.429 18.705 20.818
GDP Per Capita Growth 
3 mean 2.317 4.643 7.149 10.120 2.297 4.544 6.921 9.790
stdev 3.236 5.290 7.115 8.247 3.255 5.271 7.110 8.197
GDP Per Capita  
4 mean 12.027 12.416 12.790 13.820 11.451 11.996 12.368 13.640
stdev 9.604 9.569 9.595 9.412 9.249 9.267 9.268 9.187
Average Inflation 
5 mean 0.240 0.298 0.259 0.122 0.264 0.327 0.284 0.125
stdev 1.062 1.520 1.109 0.202 1.143 1.633 1.193 0.209
Population over 65 
6 mean 10.587 10.716 10.820 11.284 10.147 10.317 10.424 10.990
stdev 4.269 4.219 4.182 3.963 4.240 4.199 4.186 3.998
Presidential Votes 
7 mean 0.438 0.447 0.446 0.428 0.440 0.454 0.455 0.437
stdev 0.190 0.176 0.170 0.171 0.196 0.179 0.175 0.182
mean 0.384 0.386 0.388 0.390 0.396 0.398 0.401 0.402
stdev 0.186 0.181 0.176 0.164 0.182 0.176 0.170 0.157
* For detailed information on the construction of the variables see the data appendix.
8 Only for observations in Parliamentary systems: The percentage of seats in the parliament held by the current leader's party.
3 The total percentage growth of GDP Per Capita during the period.
4 The level of GDP per capita in thousands of $US in the last year of each period.
5 Average annual inflation during the period (1=100% average annual inflation).
6 The percentage of the population over age 65 in the last year of each sample.
7 Only for observations in Presidential systems: The percentage of the votes received by the current president in the first 
round of the most recent presidential elections.
12 Expenditure Categories
1 The percentage change in Expenditure Composition within 9 or 12 categories during the period.
2 The total real (inflation adjusted) percentage growth of central government expenditure during the period.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables*
Change in Expenditure 
Composition 
1






12 Estimation of the equations for a sample that avoided the overlap of observations (at the cost of substantially 




The dependent variable in all our regressions is the index of the change in expenditure 
composition between the current year and the n previous years (n=1,2,3,4) as given in the index  
above. For example, Cat9_1 is the change in the expenditure composition index between the 
current year and the previous year using the 9 basic expenditure categories given above, while 
Cat12_2 is the change in the expenditure composition index between the current year and two 
years ago using 12 expenditure categories. 
4.5 Controls 
We first set out the economic and political control variables. More details and data sources 
may be found in the data appendix. 
4.5.1 Economic variables 
Overall expenditure growth 
The ability of political actors to agree to change the composition of expenditure, that is, 
how the pie is sliced, may depend on whether or not the pie is growing. On the one hand faster 
growth of the pie may keep everyone happy and prevent the need to reallocate resources; on the 
other hand, expenditure growth may allow redirecting resources to the leader's preferred uses 
while keeping other types of spending unaffected in absolute terms. To account for that, we 
include overall expenditure growth in the equations. However, there is also a possibility that 
expenditure growth may be caused by the desire of a leader to change expenditure composition 
while avoiding conflicts. We therefore repeat our estimation without this variable to verify that 
its inclusion does not mask an underlying pressure to change the expenditure composition. 
Level and change in per-capita GDP 
Changes in the composition of expenditures may be affected by both the level of 
development and the rate of economic growth. Poorer countries may be more constrained in 
what government spending finances, while higher income allows more choices and hence greater 
flexibility in expenditure composition. The income elasticity of demand may differ across 
categories of expenditure (see, for example, Sanz and Valázquez, 2002; and Shelton, 2007) or, 
following Baumol's (1967) famous argument, that differential technological progress in 
production of goods versus services will lead to greater expenditure on the latter over time. 
Inflation 
The price of different components of government spending may rise differentially when 14 
 
there is overall inflation, so that composition percentages calculated from nominal magnitudes 
would vary with inflation even if real magnitudes remained unchanged. Price elasticities may 
also differ across government expenditure groups leading to changes in real magnitudes, for 
example, if real wages are protected by an automatic cost of living adjustment. Nevertheless, 
since the decision to protect certain expenditure components from inflation may itself reflect 
policy priorities we repeat our estimation without this control, to verify that inflation and 
protection from it are not the mechanism used by new leaders to change the budget composition. 
Because the effect of inflation may not be linear -- in part because high inflation countries 
develop mechanisms to mitigate its real effects -- we include in our equation both the inflation 
rate and the squared rate of inflation. 
Wars 
Wars may have a large and significant effect on the composition of expenditures as they 
impose significant defense costs in a short period. To account for that effect we used the 
COSIMO database from the Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research to identify 
events of military conflicts (see data appendix for details). While our data include quite a few 
observations that are defined as war years this variable had no effect on expenditure composition 
due to the use of the country fixed effects.
13 
Percent of population over 65 
Since a large fraction of government expenditure in many countries goes to various forms 
of old-age assistance, one might expect that having a large share of elderly population would 
create a strong lobby that will prevent changes in the composition of government expenditure. 
We find no significant effects of this variable (and therefore do not report the effects in the 
tables). The reason appears to be that there is little variation in this variable over time in 
individual countries while differences between countries are largely captured by the country 
fixed effects. 
4.5.2 Political variables  
In addition to change in government leadership, elections, and government strength, a 




The extent of change in composition of government expenditure may differ in majoritarian 
versus proportional electoral systems. The first is often associated with fewer parties and 
majority governments, the second with more parties and coalition governments. A simple 
proportional system can be thought of as having a single district, as opposed to many 
geographically-determined districts in a majoritarian system. Numerous papers
14 argue 
theoretically that a proportional system tilts the composition of public spending towards 
programs benefiting large groups in the population, such as public goods or universalistic 
welfare programs. Persson and Tabellini (2004) argue that much larger district size (often 
national districts) in proportional systems give parties strong incentives to seek support from 
broad coalitions in the population. In contrast, in majoritarian elections conducted in smaller 
districts, politicians target smaller, but pivotal, geographical constituencies. They find that 
countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare programs than those with proportional 
elections. These factors that affect the composition may also be associated with different 
tendencies to change it, e.g., if the pivotal constituencies change more frequently than the tastes 
of the public at large. To account for potential differences stemming from the electoral system 
we use the classifications provided in the World Bank's DPI. 
Government structure 
Analogous to the research on electoral systems, there has been research on the effect on 
government expenditure of having a presidential versus a parliamentary system of government, 
though it has primarily been concerned with its effect on the size, rather than on the composition 
of government expenditure. Persson and Tabellini (2004) argue that presidential regimes induce 
smaller governments than parliamentary democracies. To account for this possible effect we 
follow their methodology and use the definitions of the POLITY IV dataset to determine the 
country's system of government. We take no stand a priori on the question of whether a prime 
minister in a parliamentary system is expected to be stronger than a president in a presidential 
system.   
Government size 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
13 When we do not use fixed effects estimation, this coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Note also that 
the standard error is very high, so that there may be an effect, but we cannot capture significance.  
14 Persson and Tabellini (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), and Milesi‐Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002).  16 
 
The size of the government sector itself relative to the economy may also affect the extent 
of changes in the composition of government expenditures. A small government, providing 
minimal necessary functions may have little scope for changing the composition of its spending, 
while a larger one may have more room for maneuver. 
New democracies 
Given this difference in fiscal policy between new and established democracies found in 
our earlier papers, one may ask whether there are differences in changes in government budget 
composition along this dimension. Such changes would be consistent with the desire to 
significantly change the structure of the economy (as in the formerly socialist economies) or 
more generally to make large or make other. The composition effect that we examine here is not 
an election-year effect, but a secular characteristic. 
Ideological Orientation 
Several papers, as discussed in section 2, look at the connection between a government's 
ideological orientation or the policy priorities found in a party's platform and the actual 
composition of spending. We begin with an even more basic question of whether ideological 
orientation per se affects the propensity for expenditure change.  
 
5. The Effect of Replacing a Leader on Expenditure Composition  
 To test whether and when leaders affect the composition of expenditures, we begin with 
the central question of whether a change in leadership results in a change in expenditure 
composition. We start by considering short–term effects of a leader being replaced per se and 
then look at the effect when a leader is replaced in an election year as opposed to being replaced 
by other political (democratic) or exogenous mechanisms (such as death of the incumbent 
leader).  
5.1 Short-term effects – basic lack of effect 
In Table 4 we provide a simple examination of whether a change in government leadership 
actually leads to change in the composition of expenditures. We find that in the short-run it does 
not (relative to the case of the same leader being in power). This is true regardless of whether we 
control for expenditure growth or not and whether we look at 9 or 12 expenditure categories. To 
the extent that we find any effects of leaders being replaced, it is that there is a smaller change in 17 
 
expenditure composition when the leader is replaced in an election year, although this effect is 
often insignificantly different from 0. Moreover, the absence of a positive effect persists two 
years after a change in leadership, suggesting that the result is not explained simply by a problem 













1 Cat9_1 -0.128 00 1010 71 0.378
[0.603] 00
2 Cat9_1 -0.135 0 0.018 1010 71 0.379
[0.581] 0 [0.456]
3 Cat9_1 0 -0.558* 0 1010 71 0.380
0 [0.052] 0
4 Cat9_1 0 -0.561** 0.019 1010 71 0.382
0 [0.048] [0.445]
5 Cat12_1 -0.234 00 867 68 0.438
[0.406] 00
6 Cat12_1 -0.242 0 0.028 867 68 0.441
[0.386] 0 [0.296]
7 Cat12_1 0 -0.514 0 867 68 0.439
0 [0.122] 0
8 Cat12_1 0 -0.52 0.028 867 68 0.442
0 [0.112] [0.288]
9 Cat9_2 -0.205 00 912 70 0.459
[0.466] 00
10 Cat9_2 -0.205 0 0.002 912 70 0.459
[0.466] 0 [0.869]
11 Cat9_2 0 -0.113 0 912 70 0.459
0 [0.741] 0
12 Cat9_2 0 -0.115 0.003 912 70 0.459
0 [0.737] [0.829]
13 Cat12_2 -0.279 00 779 65 0.507
[0.387] 00
14 Cat12_2 -0.284 0 0.015 779 65 0.508
[0.376] 0 [0.352]
15 Cat12_2 0 -0.244 0 779 65 0.505
0 [0.523] 0
16 Cat12_2 0 -0.261 0.015 779 65 0.507
0 [0.490] [0.339]
Table 4 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 1-2 years*
* P values are in the parantheses.
 The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional 




One potential explanation is that the absence of an effect is due to entitlement spending. In 
the U.S., for example, mandatory spending (synonymous in the budget with “direct spending”) 
generally includes all spending that is made pursuant to laws other than appropriations laws, so 
that its fundamental characteristic is the lack of annual discretion to establish spending levels 
(unless the law is changed). Entitlement spending (a subset of mandatory spending), such as 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid in the U.S. and analogous programs in other countries, 
comprises half of the budget or more in many countries. In some countries strong defense or 
agricultural lobbies, teachers unions, etc. may also limit the ability to reallocate budget 
resources. 
Entitlement spending which cannot easily be changed is not, however, the explanation for 
our results on the lack of a leadership effect. First, consider the basic arithmetic argument. If a 
category of spending is fixed by law over a horizon of n years, it is fixed whether or not a leader 
is replaced. Hence, it would not explain the absence of an effect in years after a leader is 
replaced relative to years of no leader replacement.
15 Second, we also calculated the composition 
and the changes in the index excluding social protection and health, two sectors in which 
entitlement spending is dominant and in which, it is generally argued, legislation to reduce such 
spending is difficult to enact. The results were not qualitatively different from the reported 
specification, making clear that our results are not driven by fixity of entitlement spending.
16 
Another argument is that leadership changes do not matter much for “normal” changes in 
expenditure composition but they do raise the probability of eventual large changes. To account 
for this possibility we estimated logit equations in which the dependent variable was the 
probability of a change in expenditure composition that was at least one standard deviation 
above the country-specific average change (we also repeated it for similar changes above the 
sample average). The estimation (results available upon request) did not identify any significant 
effect over the one or two-year periods.  
5.2 The contribution of economic factors  






composition is mitigated when we control for the economic and political factors mentioned 
above. In Table 5 we show that this is not the case. First, consider the economic variables in the 
first block. Higher overall expenditure growth leads to more change in the composition of 
expenditure, while higher per-capita GDP growth lowers it (although this effect is not 
statistically significant at the "noisier" Cat9_1 series). These effects are similar in magnitude, so 
that changes in the composition of government expenditure increase only when overall 
expenditure grows faster than GDP. We also find that the level of GDP per-capita is not 
associated with more change in expenditure composition. We see a highly significant positive 
effect of inflation, consistent with the argument about differential rates of inflation when the 
original expenditure data is in nominal terms.
17 The negative coefficient on squared inflation 
indicates the effect is concave. All these effects, however, are small quantitatively for plausible 
values of the variables. That is, economic variables explain relatively little of expenditure 
change. 
In the second block, we examine the effect of the initial share of various expenditure 
categories, which reveal some interesting results. Higher defense spending in developed 
countries is associated, if anything, with larger subsequent changes, rather than lower changes 
(as suggested by the claim that large defense budgets in some developed countries lead to inertia 
in the budget). There is some evidence that higher defense spending in less-developed countries 
is associated with smaller changes in expenditure composition. Higher spending on social 
protection leads to lower subsequent changes, but the effect is significant only at the one-year 
horizon. Higher education spending in less-developed countries has a significant and large 
negative effect on subsequent expenditure change. We found no evidence (not reported in table) 








Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Economic variables
Expenditure growth (1% =1)
1 0.049** 0.072*** 0.031** 0.050*** 0.050** 0.072*** 0.033** 0.050***
[0.033] [0.003] [0.040] [0.001] [0.032] [0.003] [0.033] [0.001]
GDP per-capita growth (1% =1)
1 -0.062 -0.092* -0.056* -0.104*** -0.065 -0.091* -0.058* -0.103***
[0.155] [0.063] [0.068] [0.002] [0.132] [0.060] [0.055] [0.002]
GDP per-capita (in 000's of $US) 0.007 0.056 -0.006 0.059 0.001 0.054 -0.015 0.050
[0.857] [0.195] [0.908] [0.302] [0.981] [0.219] [0.763] [0.383]
Average inflation (100% inflation=1) 1.860*** 2.288*** 1.944*** 2.148*** 1.859*** 2.294*** 1.954*** 2.157***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average inflation squared -0.096*** -0.118*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.096*** -0.118*** -0.070*** -0.078***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Expenditure Composition
2
Defense share  -0.053 -0.064 -0.075 -0.125 -0.057 -0.066 -0.080 -0.130*
[0.463] [0.415] [0.272] [0.103] [0.430] [0.402] [0.245] [0.091]
Defense share * Developed 
3 -0.019 0.131 0.043 0.293** -0.021 0.130 0.034 0.279**
[0.864] [0.245] [0.724] [0.021] [0.848] [0.246] [0.778] [0.026]
Education share * Less Developed 
3 -0.242*** -0.256** -0.335*** -0.476*** -0.242*** -0.258** -0.329*** -0.472***
[0.005] [0.016] [0.005] [0.000] [0.005] [0.015] [0.006] [0.000]
Social protection share -0.066** -0.077** -0.058 -0.069 -0.065** -0.076** -0.057 -0.069
[0.027] [0.030] [0.159] [0.144] [0.029] [0.032] [0.167] [0.149]
Political Characteristics
Government size (% of GDP) 0.048** 0.085*** 0.070** 0.111*** 0.048** 0.085*** 0.072** 0.115***
[0.043] [0.002] [0.022] [0.002] [0.042] [0.002] [0.020] [0.002]
New democracy 2.016** 2.297** 2.129** 2.348** 1.972** 2.281** 2.085** 2.372**
[0.012] [0.014] [0.027] [0.039] [0.014] [0.015] [0.030] [0.039]
Presidential -1.982*** -1.653** -2.819** -3.557** -1.994*** -1.633** -2.772** -3.457**
[0.004] [0.034] [0.010] [0.038] [0.004] [0.038] [0.011] [0.045]
Majoritarian -0.343 -0.309 0.566 -0.402 -0.314 -0.260 0.615 -0.292
[0.675] [0.695] [0.554] [0.696] [0.700] [0.740] [0.518] [0.775]
Majoritarian and new democracy -3.584** -4.006** -5.545*** -7.240*** -3.583** -4.014** -5.580*** -7.297***
[0.018] [0.016] [0.002] [0.000] [0.017] [0.015] [0.002] [0.000]
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader 
4 -0.170 -0.245 -0.300 -0.376 -0.604** -0.545* -0.275 -0.481
[0.484] [0.368] [0.258] [0.204] [0.028] [0.077] [0.415] [0.179]
Constant 6.638*** 5.275*** 8.217*** 8.077*** 6.806*** 5.288*** 8.315*** 8.038***
[0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of observations 969 856 887 773 969 856 887 773
Number of countries 69 66 68 63 69 66 68 63
R-Squared 0.455 0.526 0.545 0.603 0.458 0.527 0.545 0.602
Adjusted R-Squared 0.404 0.477 0.497 0.558 0.406 0.478 0.498 0.556
1 Total growth during the period.
4 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced (in an election year, in columns 5-8) in the base year.
2 The percent of government spending on the respective category in the base year (1% share=1). 
3 The percent of government spending in the base year on the respective category multiplied by a binary variable for developed or less 
developed countries.
Table 5 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 1-2 years Including Economic and 
Political Controls.*
Replaced Leader Replaced Leader in Election Year
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.21 
 
 
5.3 Political factors 
The third block of Table 5 reports on political covariates. Several results stand out. First, 
government size (relative to GDP) has a significant positive effect on the extent of change in 
expenditure composition, suggesting that larger overall expenditure gives government more 
freedom in changing composition. We can only venture guesses on the reason for this. Small 
governments may be concentrated on more basic, central functions, giving them less flexibility 
to change composition. This doesn’t necessarily imply that large governments are engaged in 
activities that are “superfluous” or easily left to the private sector. They may be providing a 
range of public goods, where the emphasis on which to provide more of reflects changing 
circumstances or voter preferences. We leave this as a question deserving further study.  
Second, new democracies tend to change their expenditure composition substantially more 
than established ones. The effect of being a new democracy on the tendency to change the 
composition of expenditures is quite substantial quantitatively, amounting to more than 40 
percent of the average change in composition (as reported in Table 3). This effect is different in 
new democracies that have a majoritarian electoral system which tend to have smaller changes in 
expenditure composition compared to other countries (not just to other new democracies), 
though this is a very small group of countries.
18 
Third, turning to the political structure, we find no statistically significant difference 
between majoritarian and proportional systems in the amount of expenditure composition 
change. These findings complement Shelton (2007) who finds that “majoritarian governments do 
not display a clear bias towards or against any type of spending and that they simply correlate 
with reduced expenditure across the board.” We do find a significant effect of having a 
presidential system rather than a parliamentary one – presidential systems are characterized by 
smaller changes in expenditure composition, though the result is reversed when the equations are 
estimated without fixed effects. Hence, in contrast to the finding of Persson and Tabellini on the 
relation between government system and the level of spending composition (over broad 
categories) discussed above, our results provide no definitive conclusion on the effect of 
government on the change in expenditure composition.  
In Table 6 we add variables measuring the political strength and orientation of a leader, as 22 
 
well as interacting strength variables with leadership change to see if new leaders who are 
politically stronger act differently than weaker ones.
19 We find that political strength per se 
(measured in terms of standard deviations from the sample mean) does not matter for the extent 
of changes in expenditure composition.
20 As for the political orientation of the leader, we see 
that having a leader from a right or center party at the beginning of the period (regardless of 
whether or not he was replaced) tends to increase expenditure composition changes over a two-
year period. We have no a priori explanation for this result. It may reflect differences in the 
cohesiveness of left versus right or center parties, or differences in party ability to prioritize.  
When political strength is interacted with change of leader, we find an intriguing result. In 
presidential systems, strong new leaders change expenditure composition by less than weak ones 
(where strength is measured by vote share in the election). This seems contrary to the intuition 
that presidents who come in with “electoral mandates” are able to effect more change. In Table 
7, we divide the sample into developed and less developed countries and see indeed that this 
result is driven by less-developed countries where the bulk of presidential systems are.
21 If 
anything, a strong new leader in a less-developed country is associated with less expenditure 
change in the year or two after election relative to a weak one.  
Here too, we can only speculate on the reason for this result. Expenditure change reflects 
not only changed ideology, but also distributive politics. In many countries, supporters of the 
new leader want to share in the spoils of office. A strong leader with wide support may be better 
able to resist these pressures, whereas a weaker one may need to use government largesse to 
strengthen his position. The association of weakness and more composition change shows up 
elsewhere in our results as well. We cannot make definitive statements, but this is clearly an 













Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Economic variables
Expenditure Growth (1% =1)
1 0.047** 0.070*** 0.031** 0.052*** 0.047** 0.070*** 0.033** 0.052***
[0.045] [0.004] [0.047] [0.001] [0.045] [0.004] [0.031] [0.001]
GDP per-capita growth (1% =1)
1 -0.058 -0.089* -0.046 -0.092*** -0.063 -0.091* -0.050* -0.091***
[0.180] [0.070] [0.121] [0.004] [0.145] [0.062] [0.089] [0.004]
GDP per-capita (in 000's of USD) 0.005 0.056 -0.009 0.066 0.001 0.055 -0.008 0.057
[0.892] [0.194] [0.908] [0.234] [0.985] [0.209] [0.863] [0.308]
Average inflation (100% inflation=1) 1.840*** 2.270*** 1.973*** 2.128*** 1.837*** 2.268*** 1.959*** 2.108***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average inflation squared -0.094*** -0.115*** -0.072*** -0.078*** -0.095*** -0.117*** -0.070*** -0.077***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Expenditure Composition
2
Defense share  -0.038 -0.046 -0.052 -0.105 -0.042 -0.049 -0.055 -0.110
[0.615] [0.568] [0.460] [0.180] [0.569] [0.542] [0.437] [0.159]
Defense share * Developed 
3 -0.040 0.114 0.028 0.294** -0.042 0.111 0.011 0.274**
[0.713] [0.314] [0.814] [0.019] [0.694] [0.326] [0.926] [0.029]
Education share * Less Developed 
3 -0.242*** -0.257** -0.331*** -0.474*** -0.243*** -0.261** -0.329*** -0.474***
[0.005] [0.014] [0.006] [0.000] [0.005] [0.013] [0.006] [0.000]
Social protection share -0.066** -0.077** -0.063 -0.077 -0.066** -0.076** -0.062 -0.077
[0.029] [0.035] [0.125] [0.109] [0.029] [0.035] [0.134] [0.112]
Political Characteristics
Government Size (% of GDP) 0.040* 0.078*** 0.056* 0.096*** 0.040* 0.079*** 0.059* 0.100***
[0.099] [0.005] [0.079] [0.010] [0.099] [0.004] [0.066] [0.007]
New Democracy 1.943** 2.279** 2.039** 2.179* 1.919** 2.289** 2.023** 2.228*
[0.016] [0.015] [0.033] [0.057] [0.018] [0.016] [0.035] [0.053]
Presidential -1.803** -1.264 -2.562** -3.443** -1.796** -1.241 -2.507** -3.377**
[0.015] [0.139] [0.023] [0.044] [0.015] [0.144] [0.025] [0.048]
Majoritarian -0.323 -0.289 0.853 -0.102 -0.296 -0.247 0.907 -0.026
[0.697] [0.719] [0.366] [0.918] [0.719] [0.755] [0.334] [0.979]
Majoritarian and New Democracy -3.378** -3.875** -4.967*** -6.294*** -3.368** -3.856** -4.910*** -6.375***
[0.025] [0.019] [0.005] [0.002] [0.024] [0.018] [0.006] [0.002]
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader 
4 -0.139 -0.078 -0.158 0.007 -0.475 -0.217 0.196 -0.055
[0.630] [0.796] [0.622] [0.983] [0.135] [0.544] [0.682] [0.899]
Vote_pres * Replaced Leader
5 -0.193 -0.368 -0.584 -0.946** -0.453 -0.724 -0.728* -0.764*
[0.622] [0.379] [0.111] [0.015] [0.265] [0.103] [0.087] [0.071]
Party_parl * Replaced Leader
5 0.189 -0.043 0.426 0.113 0.254 0.020 -0.370 -0.156
[0.566] [0.892] [0.301] [0.800] [0.451] [0.953] [0.487] [0.747]
Vote_pres -0.159 -0.245 0.143 0.555 -0.125 -0.216 0.158 0.469
[0.631] [0.528] [0.727] [0.241] [0.713] [0.585] [0.698] [0.324]
Party strength_parl 0.079 0.191 0.358 0.677* 0.084 0.178 0.562 0.726**
[0.755] [0.463] [0.326] [0.082] [0.716] [0.465] [0.112] [0.046]
leader from right or center 0.545** 0.282 0.850*** 0.671** 0.536** 0.272 0.828*** 0.648**
[0.023] [0.254] [0.002] [0.024] [0.025] [0.272] [0.004] [0.032]
Constant 6.570*** 5.131*** 7.769*** 7.501*** 6.723*** 5.161*** 7.763*** 7.550***
[0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.001]
Number of observations 969 856 887 773 969 856 887 773
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 6 96 66 86 36 96 66 86 3
R-Squared 0.459 0.529 0.553 0.611 0.463 0.531 0.552 0.608
Adjusted R-Squared 0.404 0.476 0.503 0.564 0.408 0.479 0.503 0.561
1 Total growth during the period.
3 The percent of government spending in the base year on the respective category multiplied by a binary variable for developed or less 
developed countries.
5 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in 
parliament in a parliamentary system) and the variable "replaced leader".
Table 6 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 1-2 years Including Economic and 
Political Controls and Leader Characteristics.*
Replaced Leader Replaced Leader in Election Year
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
2 The percent of government spending on the respective category in the base year (1% share=1). 
4 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced (in an election year, in columns 5-8) in the base year.24 
 
 
Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Economic variables
Expenditure growth (1% =1)
1 0.011 0.079** 0.040 0.102*** 0.056** 0.074** 0.032 0.060***
[0.838] [0.043] [0.226] [0.000] [0.036] [0.013] [0.104] [0.002]
GDP per-capita growth (1% =1)
1 0.003 0.003 -0.053 -0.068* -0.121* -0.158** -0.055 -0.121**
[0.957] [0.965] [0.191] [0.082] [0.054] [0.029] [0.218] [0.015]
GDP per-capita (in 000's of USD) 0.017 0.070 0.016 0.102** -0.419 -0.187 -0.268 0.324
[0.708] [0.101] [0.750] [0.045] [0.175] [0.727] [0.413] [0.568]
Average inflation (100% inflation=1) 0.836 -1.801 2.960 2.493 1.690*** 2.011*** 1.580*** 1.605***
[0.790] [0.593] [0.502] [0.625] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average inflation squared 1.618 5.438 2.934 4.948 -0.088*** -0.105*** -0.058*** -0.059***
[0.715] [0.241] [0.593] [0.417] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Expenditure Composition
2
Defense share -0.026 0.098 0.011 0.228*** -0.099 -0.086 -0.115 -0.155
[0.711] [0.141] [0.904] [0.004] [0.238] [0.443] [0.188] [0.173]
Education share 0.013 0.032 -0.092 -0.176* -0.227** -0.230** -0.268** -0.384***
[0.856] [0.700] [0.298] [0.093] [0.012] [0.036] [0.038] [0.008]
Social Protection share -0.056 -0.046 0.011 0.032 -0.059 -0.093 -0.191*** -0.299***
[0.112] [0.307] [0.819] [0.592] [0.352] [0.221] [0.006] [0.000]
Agriculture share 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.137 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.131
0.000 [0.236] 0.000 [0.415] 0.000 [0.903] 0.000 [0.203]
Political Characteristics
Government size (% of GDP) 0.045* 0.072*** 0.067** 0.104*** 0.025 0.101 0.034 0.132
[0.085] [0.009] [0.044] [0.006] [0.687] [0.214] [0.661] [0.172]
New democracy 0.525 1.465 1.940 3.182 2.417** 2.891** 1.661 2.221*
[0.714] [0.346] [0.254] [0.106] [0.030] [0.012] [0.157] [0.100]
Majoritarian 0.043 -0.212 0.547 -0.139 -0.790 -0.030 1.485 -0.538
[0.961] [0.820] [0.587] [0.897] [0.701] [0.987] [0.585] [0.862]
Majoritarian and new democracy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.773** -4.480** -5.034*** -6.066***
[.] [.] [.] [.] [0.019] [0.010] [0.007] [0.005]
Presidential -0.169 0.000 -0.174 0.000 -1.223 -0.724 -2.312 -3.297
[0.896] [.] [0.892] [.] [0.290] [0.498] [0.243] [0.156]
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader in EY
3 -0.498* -0.266 0.209 0.180 -0.035 0.186 -0.073 -0.208
[0.060] [0.307] [0.643] [0.676] [0.962] [0.832] [0.923] [0.815]
Vote_pres * Replaced leader in EY
4 -0.010 0.071 0.011 -0.242 -1.409* -1.871** -1.194* -1.455*
[0.948] [0.554] [0.977] [0.187] [0.051] [0.020] [0.093] [0.052]
Party_parl * Replaced leader in EY
4 0.136 -0.029 -0.104 0.299 0.142 -0.120 -0.448 -0.869
[0.651] [0.919] [0.848] [0.475] [0.816] [0.847] [0.492] [0.211]
Vote_pres -0.441* -0.173 -0.356 -0.003 0.031 -0.147 0.476 0.757
[0.084] [0.689] [0.205] [0.993] [0.947] [0.774] [0.420] [0.264]
Party strength_parl -0.026 0.150 0.047 0.212 0.173 0.255 1.051 1.472*
[0.908] [0.469] [0.877] [0.457] [0.666] [0.598] [0.140] [0.053]
Constant 3.203 -0.584 1.563 -3.318 11.647*** 9.666* 17.174*** 18.628***
[0.159] [0.828] [0.553] [0.313] [0.003] [0.086] [0.000] [0.001]
Number of observations 524 453 493 426 445 403 394 347
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 2 42 22 42 24 54 44 44 1
R-Squared 0.229 0.321 0.262 0.391 0.390 0.427 0.493 0.527
Adjusted R-Squared 0.164 0.257 0.193 0.327 0.289 0.321 0.397 0.425
1 Total growth during the period.
2 The percent of government spending on the respective category in the base year (1% share=1). 
4 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in 
parliament in a parliamentary system) and the variable "Replaced Leader in EY".
Table 7: Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition in Developed and Less Developed 
Countries: 1-2 years*
Developed Less Developed
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.




The division of the sample into developed and less-developed countries reveals some other 
interesting results as well. The government size effect we saw before becomes stronger in 
developed countries, while disappearing entirely in less-developed ones. As already mentioned, 
this seems an interesting point for further study. Inflation loses significance in developed 
countries, which we attribute primarily to the much lower rates of inflation in these countries 
implying lower inflation differentials across categories.  
  We performed several other tests of political effects, as described in the various boxes in 
Table 8. First, does the effect of a new leader on expenditure composition change depend on 
whether he is replacing a leader with a different political ideology? In the first regression, we 
limit the definition of “replaced leader” to cases of an elected leader whose party alignment 
differs from his predecessor. The results indicate this does not matter; the coefficient on 
expenditure change if the new leader has a different political alignment is actually negative, 
though not statistically significant, The second and third lines are interaction effects of the leader 
with a different political alignment with measures of political strength. Once again, to the extent 
that there is any effect, it is negative.  
In the second box, we specify the direction of the change, also to no effect. We also 
consider cases where the largest coalition party changes (which generally overlaps with a change 
in leader, but is not identical); the coefficients still indicate no significant short-run effect on 
change in composition. In short, our earlier lack of an effect of change in leaders did not arise 
because leadership change did not indicate ideology change.  
  These results would appear to contrast with that of Tsebelis and Chang (2004), who 
found (see above) that budget composition does change relative to the previous year's 
government if the ideological composition of the government changes (independent of whether 
or not there was a change in leader herself), provided the ideological distance between parties in 
the government is not too great. The difference in results may reflect their use of a much smaller 
sample or their looking at ideological difference between governments in successive years rather 
than changes in leadership. These are not the same. That is, one could have a change in the 
ideological composition of the governing coalition under the same leader; conversely, there 
could be a change in leadership without a change in the government's ideology. 
 26 
 
Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
-0.346 -0.425 0.051 -0.201 -0.328 -0.318 0.560 0.122
[0.306] [0.245] [0.901] [0.661] [0.373] [0.419] [0.242] [0.808]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.016 -0.197 -0.786 -0.667
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.983] [0.804] [0.242] [0.354]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.034 -0.111 -0.640 -0.262
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.936] [0.790] [0.283] [0.692]
Replaced leader in EY 
1 -0.592** -0.538* -0.275 -0.484 -0.596** -0.559* -0.262 -0.462
[0.032] [0.081] [0.414] [0.174] [0.031] [0.071] [0.438] [0.195]
Leader change from Left to Right -0.074 0.489 -0.367 -0.271 -0.302 -0.807 0.345 -0.071
[0.884] [0.581] [0.512] [0.691] [0.710] [0.416] [0.747] [0.951]
Leader change from Right to Left -0.818 -1.100* 0.310 0.216 -1.248 -1.975 1.732 1.712
[0.115] [0.080] [0.677] [0.818] [0.315] [0.143] [0.395] [0.488]
0.272 1.516* -0.869 -0.254
[0.706] [0.082] [0.336] [0.803]
0.496 1.038 -1.644 -1.711
[0.670] [0.400] [0.368] [0.432]
Replaced leader in EY 
1 -0.590** -0.537* -0.323 -0.553 0.029 -0.201 0.225 0.200
[0.042] [0.097] [0.347] [0.121] [0.954] [0.722] [0.684] [0.740]
Number of Parties in Government  0.148 0.116 0.150 0.085 0.202* 0.149 0.199 0.161
[0.130] [0.285] [0.213] [0.525] [0.062] [0.235] [0.138] [0.291]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.253 -0.141 -0.226 -0.317*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.115] [0.449] [0.212] [0.087]
Replaced leader in EY 
1 -0.573** -0.526* -0.335 -0.571 -0.594** -0.554* -0.188 -0.394
[0.044] [0.098] [0.331] [0.110] [0.032] [0.066] [0.609] [0.292]
Presidential control
3 0.214 0.228 0.989 1.232* 0.183 0.185 1.189* 1.485*
[0.697] [0.724] [0.114] [0.085] [0.754] [0.789] [0.082] [0.059]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.136 -0.700 -0.822
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.878] [0.861] [0.330] [0.292]
Replaced leader in EY 
1 -0.593** -0.542* -0.281 -0.490 -0.936 -1.478 -1.669 -1.867
[0.030] [0.077] [0.406] [0.171] [0.408] [0.259] [0.228] [0.188]
Political Constraints 
4 -3.096** -3.109** -1.064 -1.108 -3.228** -3.494** -1.698 -1.796
[0.018] [0.041] [0.513] [0.565] [0.019] [0.033] [0.347] [0.408]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.768 2.127 3.118 3.139
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.748] [0.444] [0.329] [0.323]
-0.316 -0.169 -0.024 -0.305 -0.303 -0.154 -0.023 -0.336
[0.387] [0.672] [0.953] [0.426] [0.407] [0.700] [0.955] [0.388]
Replaced leader in Early EY
6 -1.066*** -1.181*** -0.693 -0.735 -1.058*** -1.170*** -0.660 -0.671
[0.002] [0.003] [0.198] [0.258] [0.002] [0.003] [0.216] [0.297]
Vote_pres -0.266 -0.381 -0.060 0.256
[0.422] [0.322] [0.882] [0.581]
Party_parl 0.091 0.134 0.388 0.607*
[0.666] [0.543] [0.208] [0.061]
5 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in predetermined elections in the base year.
6 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in early elections in the base year.
4  POLCONIII from Henisz (2002). A measure of the political constraints on government decision making i.e. the extent to which a 
change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy. The variable has a range of 0 to 1 (with 1 being 
maximum constraint) and an in-sample average of 0.432.
Table 8: Political Effects on the Relationship Between Leadership Change and Expenditure Composition 
Change*
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t, and the economic, expenditure composition and political variables that appear in Table 5. The regressions in the first box also 
include the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system and the largest party's share of seats in parliament in a 
parliamentary system. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Vote_pres * Replaced leader with 
different alignment in EY
2
Party_parl * Replaced leader with 
different alignment in EY
2
Replaced leader with different 
alignment in EY
1
Largest Government party change 
from Left to Right
Largest Government party change 
from Right to Left
Political Constraints * Replaced 
leader in EY
Presidential control * Replaced 
leader in EY
Number of Parties in Government * 
Replaced leader in EY
3 A binary variable with a value of 1 in a presidential system when the president's party is the largest party in government and in 
parliament.
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in elections (with a leader of a different alignment in the first box) 
in the base year.
2 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in 
parliament in a parliamentary system) and the variable "replaced leader with different alignment".





In the third box, we consider the effect of the number of parties in the coalition. 
Conventional wisdom is that the larger the coalition, the less able it is to undertake policy 
change. (See, for example, Roubini and Sachs [1989].) The first line indicates that when we 
control for this variable, the results on a new leader are unchanged from before. The coefficient 
on the number of parties is positive (although not significant), indicating that, if anything, the 
larger the coalition, the more expenditure composition changes, which seems in contrast to what 
is often argued. One interpretation is along the lines of the ability of leaders to resist demands for 
spending presented above. The larger the coalition, the more the budget must be changed to keep 
the coalition together, and this effect offsets the lower ability to reach decisions. This is another 
issue to study that is raised by these results. We also find that there is no significant difference in 
the effect of the number of parties in the coalition on the tendency of newly elected leaders to 
change the composition compared to continuing ones. 
In the fourth box, we check whether presidents whose parties are the largest in the 
government and in parliament are more likely to change the composition of expenditure. We find 
that such power in parliament has a positive (although statistically significant only at the two-
year horizon) effect on such changes, but it is not different between new and continuing leaders; 
when we interact the replaced leader variable with this parliamentary effect we find that new 
presidents who enjoy such a support are not different than continuing ones.  
In the fifth box, we check whether strong political constraints, as reflected in a measure of 
the strength of "veto players" (Henisz [2002]), account for the lack of effect of leadership 
changes on expenditure composition. We find that more constraints do reduce expenditure 
composition changes at the one-year regressions, but that this variable does not account for the 
lack of effect of leadership changes.
22  
Finally, in the sixth box, we examine whether the lack of leadership change effect reflects 
the experience of new leaders who were elected in early elections (elections that took place 
before their originally scheduled fate) and therefore did not have time to prepare properly prior 
to taking office. We find that, indeed, leaders that were elected in early elections tend to change 
the expenditure composition significantly less in their first year in office. Nevertheless, we find 
that new leaders that were elected in predetermined elections (those that took place at the date set 28 
 
after the previous elections) do not change the expenditure composition more than continuing 
ones. 
5.4 Is it Data Quality?  
Another response to the lack of a leadership effect is that it may simply reflect poor quality 
data in such a broad sample. On the assumption that data quality may be higher in developed 
countries, there should then be an effect in developed countries. Table 7 shows that this is not the 
case – the absence of a positive effect of leadership changes on expenditure composition is 
common to both country categories. In Table 9 we present results on the effect of leadership 
changes in two more restricted sets of developed economies.
23 In the left-hand box, we report 
results for the sample of 19 countries that Tsebelis and Chang (2004) used for their study; in the 
right-hand box we present results when Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are excluded from 
this group (the first two because of arguments by some that there is budget manipulation; the 
latter two because they were “New Democracies” over part of the sample period). In both cases 
we find basically the same results previously reported – there is no positive effect of leadership 
change on changes in expenditure composition over one- or two-year windows. In short, our 
results are not driven by poor data quality in developing countries. 
Another concern may be that the lack of change we find reflects too high a level of 
aggregation (which is as disaggregated as can be found for such a large panel of countries). That 
is, significant expenditure changes may be taking place within our broader categories which 
cannot be detected. We cannot tell, but this line of argument seems unconvincing to us. Parties 
and candidates claim to differ on large issues such as defense versus social spending which 








Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader in EY
1 -0.424* -0.341 0.006 0.223 -0.194 -0.158 0.104 0.120
[0.076] [0.151] [0.988] [0.596] [0.390] [0.500] [0.762] [0.734]
Party_parl * Replaced leader in EY
2 -0.232 -0.227 -0.020 -0.067 -0.244 -0.233 -0.158 -0.216
[0.285] [0.346] [0.953] [0.851] [0.240] [0.320] [0.576] [0.484]
leader from right or center 0.367 0.011 0.834** 0.264 0.260 0.215 0.666** 0.642**
[0.152] [0.964] [0.021] [0.442] [0.226] [0.345] [0.027] [0.034]
Vote_pres -0.081 0.000 -0.255** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.492] [.] [0.028] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.]
Party strength_parl 0.071 0.138 0.189 0.347 0.181 0.186 0.235 0.363
[0.679] [0.453] [0.412] [0.164] [0.287] [0.316] [0.275] [0.133]
Constant 2.153*** 1.734** 0.343 2.611** 1.965** 1.472* -0.133 1.816
[0.006] [0.044] [0.877] [0.026] [0.012] [0.089] [0.954] [0.106]
Number of observations 468 396 436 374 405 361 383 343
Number of countries 19 18 19 18 15 15 15 15
R-Squared 0.186 0.220 0.222 0.251 0.159 0.230 0.208 0.283
Adjusted R-Squared 0.126 0.158 0.158 0.186 0.104 0.173 0.150 0.224
‡ Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom
2 An interaction between the largest party's share of seats in parliament in a parliamentary system and the variable "replaced leader in 
EY".
† Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom
Table 9 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 1-2 years in Selected OECD countries*
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 
or in t and the economic and political variables variables that appear in Table 5. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 
10 percent level, respectively.
Tsebelis & Chang 19 
† OECD 15
‡
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in an election year in the base year.
 
5.5 Spurious (lack of) causation? 
Yet another possibility is that leaders raise expenditures as a mechanism to facilitate 
composition changes, so that the significant positive effect of growth of expenditures on 
composition change is masking the effect of a change of leader effect on change in expenditure 
composition. That is, there is a multicollinearity problem when expenditure growth is included in 
the expenditure composition regressions. In Table 10, as in Table 4, we show that our main 
results are not sensitive to the inclusion of expenditure growth as a control. 
To summarize, we find no evidence that a change in government leader results in a larger 
change in the composition of government expenditure in the first two years after the change 
relative to no change in leaders. If anything, a change in leaders is associated with less change. 
How can one explain this lack of effect?  
6. Longer-run Effects  
To address this question, we examine whether leadership changes are reflected in 
composition changes over a longer horizon, a four-year period (which corresponds to a term of 
office in many countries). 30 
 
Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_2 Cat12_2
12345678
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader in EY
1 -0.542* -0.355 0.194 -0.008 -0.597** -0.531* -0.218 -0.356
[0.083] [0.324] [0.680] [0.985] [0.036] [0.099] [0.518] [0.328]
Vote_pres_Replaced Leader in EY
2 -0.402 -0.613 -0.712* -0.761* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.340] [0.190] [0.098] [0.079] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Party_parl_Replaced Leader in EY
2 0.419 0.323 -0.220 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.199] [0.361] [0.677] [0.910] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
leader from right or center 0.511** 0.232 0.743** 0.532* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.038] [0.360] [0.010] [0.084] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vote_pres -0.262 -0.435 0.106 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.456] [0.292] [0.806] [0.505] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Party strength_parl 0.029 0.112 0.519 0.669* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.902] [0.657] [0.153] [0.074] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant 6.515*** 5.565*** 9.044*** 9.844*** 6.713*** 5.809*** 9.737*** 10.429***
[0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of observations 969 856 887 773 969 856 887 773
Number of countries 69 66 68 63 69 66 68 63
R-Squared 0.452 0.515 0.552 0.604 0.447 0.510 0.545 0.598
Adjusted R-Squared 0.397 0.461 0.502 0.557 0.395 0.459 0.498 0.553
2 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in 
parliament in a parliamentary system) and the variable "replaced leader".
Table 10: Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition over 1-2 years, without Controlling for 
Expenditure Growth
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included control for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 or 
in t and the economic and political variables that appear in Table 5. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively.
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in the base year which was an election year.
 
In Table 11 we examine simple regressions of changes in expenditure composition on 
leadership changes, both for all leadership changes and for those associated with elections. To do 
this we measure the change in expenditure composition over a 4-year period and check whether 
the leader was replaced in the base year (we include controls for the possibility that there had 
been a successive leadership change during the period). We find that over this period, leadership 
changes are indeed associated with larger changes in expenditure composition. This effect is 
statistically significant only at the more detailed classification of 12 expenditure categories and 


















1 Cat9_4 0.415 00 705 55 0.489
[0.284] 00
2 Cat9_4 0.446 0 0.041*** 705 55 0.507
[0.236] 0 [0.000]
3 Cat9_4 0 0.48 0 705 55 0.490
0 [0.283] 0
4 Cat9_4 0 0.459 0.041*** 705 55 0.508
0 [0.291] [0.000]
5 Cat12_4 0.849* 00 603 51 0.563
[0.063] 00
6 Cat12_4 0.957** 0 0.056*** 603 51 0.593
[0.029] 0 [0.000]
7 Cat12_4 0 1.082** 0 603 51 0.565
0 [0.034] 0
8 Cat12_4 0 1.073** 0.055*** 603 51 0.594
0 [0.029] [0.000]
Table 11 - Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 4 years*
* P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an 
additional leadership during the covered period. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 
10 percent level, respectively.
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in the base year.
2 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in the base year, and that year was 
an election year.  
This result remains even with the inclusion of the economic and political controls we used 
in the earlier regressions, as can be seen in Table 12. We also find that the economic variables 
that we found as affecting expenditure composition change in Table 5 retain their impact at the 
four-year frame and that the effect of defense spending in developed countries in the base period 
becomes larger. We also find that the level of GDP per-capita now has a positive and significant 
effect. In Table 13 we find that for the subset of developed countries the effect is somewhat 
stronger and with larger statistical significance. Though statistically significant, the magnitudes 
are not large – in the sample as a whole a change of about 0.7 percent attributable to a leadership 
change relative to 9% change over a four-year period (see Table 3). It is larger in the developed 
countries, 1% relative to 6% mean change (see Table A-3). 32 
 




1 0.061*** 0.076*** 0.057*** 0.076***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDP per-capita growth 
1 -0.051* -0.069** -0.053** -0.068**
[0.053] [0.014] [0.046] [0.017]
GDP per-capita (in 000's of USD) 0.162** 0.165** 0.158** 0.161**
[0.011] [0.028] [0.012] [0.035]
Average Inflation (100% inflation=1) 10.577*** 9.070*** 10.096*** 9.143***
[0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.005]
Average Inflation squared -4.811*** -4.163** -4.538*** -4.180**
[0.002] [0.019] [0.002] [0.018]
Expenditure Composition
2
Defense share * Less Developed
3 -0.124 -0.126 -0.084 -0.128
[0.171] [0.202] [0.356] [0.222]
Defense share * Developed
3 0.292** 0.471*** 0.279** 0.479***
[0.017] [0.000] [0.021] [0.000]
Social Protection share  -0.072 -0.040 -0.071 -0.039
[0.130] [0.439] [0.135] [0.450]
Education share * Less Developed
3 -0.303 -0.553** -0.284 -0.559**
[0.185] [0.035] [0.218] [0.036]
Political Characteristics
Government Size (% of GDP) 0.115** 0.129** 0.110** 0.125**
[0.014] [0.017] [0.019] [0.023]
New Democracy 2.309* 1.057 2.312* 1.002
[0.080] [0.431] [0.067] [0.469]
Majoritarian -0.940 -1.205 -0.873 -1.138
[0.323] [0.208] [0.361] [0.231]
Majoritarian and New Democracy -7.214*** -8.618*** -7.411*** -8.378***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Presidential 0.000 0.000 0.965 -0.042
0.000 0.000 [0.452] [0.980]
Leader Characteristics
Replaced leader 
4 0.263 0.739* 0.285 0.739*
[0.480] [0.078] [0.441] [0.079]
Vote_pres 0.000 0.000 -0.978** 0.147
0.000 0.000 [0.023] [0.830]
Party strength_parl 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.297
0.000 0.000 [0.791] [0.440]
Constant 3.264 3.568 3.415 3.547
[0.272] [0.271] [0.258] [0.297]
Number of observations 698 600 698 600
Number of countries 55 51 55 51
R-Squared 0.576 0.657 0.580 0.658
Adjusted R-Squared 0.527 0.613 0.530 0.612
1 Total growth during the period (1% growth=1).
Table 12: Leadership Change Effects on Expenditure Composition: 4 years 
Including Economic and Political Controls.*
* P values are in the parantheses.
 The equations included controls for cases where there was an 
additional leadership change during the covered period. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
4 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced in the base year.
3 The percent of government spending in the base year on the respective category multiplied by a 
binary variable for developed or less developed countries.
Replaced Leader








1 1.008** 1.085** 0.827* 1.003**
[0.015] [0.024] [0.071] [0.034]
Vote_pres 0.013 -0.453 0.045 -0.463*
[0.937] [0.122] [0.815] [0.089]
Party strength_parl -0.174 0.255 -0.145 0.267
[0.620] [0.433] [0.673] [0.410]
Constant -4.424 -1.397 -4.756 -1.857
[0.167] [0.461] [0.148] [0.356]
Number of observations 423 362 423 362
Number of countries 22 20 22 20
R-Squared 0.338 0.442 0.343 0.436
Adjusted R-Squared 0.278 0.389 0.284 0.384
1 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced (in an election year in columns 3-
4) in the base year.
* P values are in the parantheses.
 The equations include the controls that appear in Table 12. *,** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Table 13: Leadership Change and Political Strength Effects on Expenditure 
Composition in 4 years Periods - Developed Countries.* 
Replaced Leader




Therefore, a part of the answer to why changes in the composition of government 
expenditure in the first two years after a change in government leader are no larger than when 
there is no change in leaders – and, if anything, change less– is: “It takes time.” Changes in 
expenditure composition take more time to implement than campaign promises may suggest. 
This may be due to a learning process after taking office, legislative procedures, and bureaucratic 
lags. And, it may depend on the motivation to make changes, as the election year results in the 
next section suggest. 
 
7. Election-year Effects  
The ability of (experienced) leaders to change expenditure composition can be seen in the 
results on changes in spending composition in election years. In Table 14 we add an election 
year dummy to our earlier one-year regressions. There is still no direct effect of replaced leader, 
as before. We find however that election years in established democracies are associated with 
larger changes in expenditure composition than in non-election years, the difference being both 
statistically significant and large in magnitude (on the order of ¾ of a percent, where the mean 
change reported in Table 3 was about 4.5%). When we interact election year with new 34 
 
democracy, we find a negative coefficient , although in most cases not statistically significant, 
implying that in new democracies, expenditure composition is not changed more in election 
years – and possibly even less - than in other years. In other words, the higher change in 
expenditure composition associated with election years is a phenomenon of established 
democracies. 
 
Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1
1234 5 678
Economic variables
Expenditure Growth (1% growth=1)
1 0.069*** 0.079*** 0.000 0.000 0.070*** 0.080*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] 0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] 0.000 0.000
Political Characteristics
New Democracy 2.278*** 2.869*** 2.165*** 2.673*** 2.285*** 2.914*** 2.158** 2.700***
[0.006] [0.001] [0.010] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001] [0.011] [0.002]
Leader Characteristics
Election Year and New Democracy -0.923** -0.602 -0.856* -0.582 -0.862* -0.613 -0.800 -0.601
[0.035] [0.250] [0.058] [0.289] [0.070] [0.276] [0.104] [0.307]
Election Year and Established Democracy 0.634** 0.779** 0.634** 0.777** 0.704** 0.780** 0.696** 0.773**
[0.022] [0.011] [0.023] [0.012] [0.030] [0.024] [0.035] [0.029]
Election year in t+1 0.209 0.015 0.229 0.053 0.133 -0.018 0.147 0.020
[0.368] [0.952] [0.323] [0.830] [0.578] [0.942] [0.537] [0.936]
Replaced leader 
2 -0.025 0.021 -0.095 -0.073 -0.154 0.090 -0.265 -0.051
[0.928] [0.941] [0.737] [0.797] [0.583] [0.788] [0.368] [0.883]
Vote_pres_Replaced Leader
3 -0.216 -0.366 -0.152 -0.272 -0.599 -0.820* -0.516 -0.698
[0.587] [0.386] [0.704] [0.519] [0.129] [0.061] [0.218] [0.132]
Party_parl_Replaced Leader
3 0.158 -0.021 0.370 0.237 0.039 -0.073 0.324 0.285
[0.629] [0.947] [0.275] [0.478] [0.891] [0.823] [0.297] [0.416]
Vote_pres -0.244 -0.208 -0.450 -0.470 -0.204 -0.183 -0.404 -0.435
[0.462] [0.595] [0.189] [0.242] [0.549] [0.645] [0.247] [0.284]
Party strength_parl 0.026 0.158 -0.042 0.071 0.058 0.162 0.002 0.092
[0.916] [0.547] [0.867] [0.786] [0.796] [0.503] [0.992] [0.704]
Constant 4.382*** 3.229* 5.602*** 4.814*** 4.494*** 3.225* 5.723*** 4.804***
[0.001] [0.053] [0.000] [0.008] [0.001] [0.054] [0.000] [0.009]
Number of observations 966 850 966 850 966 850 966 850
Number of countries 69 66 69 66 69 66 69 66
R-Squared 0.487 0.539 0.470 0.520 0.490 0.542 0.473 0.522
Adjusted R-Squared 0.433 0.486 0.415 0.464 0.436 0.488 0.418 0.467
1 Total growth during the period.
2 A binary variable that receives the value 1 if the leader was replaced (in an election year in columns 5-8) in the base year.
Table 14: Election Year Effects on Expenditure Composition*
3 An interaction between the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system (the largest party's share of seats in parliament in 
a parliamentary system) and the variable "replaced leader".
*P values are in the parantheses. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t-1 or in t 
and the economic and political variables variables that appear in Table 5. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively.
Replaced Leader Replaced Leader in Election Year
 
In Table 15 we examine the robustness of our findings with respect to the election year 
effect, accounting for various political factors that may be associated with it. In the first box we 
show that the president's party being the largest in parliament does not affect composition 35 
 
changes in election years. In the second and third boxes, respectively, we find that the election 
year effect does not depend on the governmental system (presidential versus parliamentary), nor 
on the electoral system (majoritarian versus proportional). In the fourth box, we examine 
whether the initial political strength of the incumbent is associated with the magnitude of change 
in composition during election years; we find no evidence for such an effect in parliamentary 
systems, while in presidential ones we find some evidence that politically strong leaders tend to 
change the composition in election years less than weaker ones. Nevertheless, in all these 
specifications the main results stand: leaders in established democracies tend to change the 
composition of expenditures in election years more than in other years, while those in new 
democracies do not. 
Given our earlier work, we find this not at all surprising. In Brender and Drazen (2005) we 
found that new democracies, but not established ones, raise their overall level of expenditures 
significantly in election years. As discussed earlier in the paper, the absence of an election-year 
increase in total expenditures in election years in established democracies in general is probably 
related to the fact that voters punish such increases at the polls, as found in Brender and Drazen 
(2008). In contrast, we found no evidence that election-year increases in total expenditures or 
deficits significantly affect reelection probabilities in new democracies. Since increasing overall 
expenditures or deficits is not an effective tool to gain votes in established democracies (in fact, 
it reduces the probability of re-election), leaders may rely on changes in the composition of 
spending to help election efforts. This result is consistent with models of incumbents using the 
spending composition (Drazen and Eslava, 2009) or targeting special interest groups (Drazen 
and Eslava, 2008) to gain votes without changing the deficit. 
In the fifth box we distinguish between predetermined elections (elections that took place in 
the original year scheduled when the previous elections took place) and endogenous (early) 
elections. We find that the positive election year effect in established democracies is due to 
elections that took place in their predetermined year, indicating that some preparation is probably 




24 In our sample of elections, 61 percent are defined as predetermined. 36 
 
Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1 Cat9_1 Cat12_1
12345678
Box 1
Election Year in Established Democracy
2 0.521* 0.514* 0.643** 0.635** 0.542* 0.512* 0.604* 0.570*
[0.055] [0.057] [0.031] [0.032] [0.075] [0.088] [0.062] [0.072]
Election Year in New Democracy
2 -0.939** -0.874* -0.661 -0.628 -0.908* -0.864* -0.689 -0.683
[0.036] [0.055] [0.222] [0.261] [0.062] [0.081] [0.238] [0.254]
Presidential Control
3 0.219 0.207 0.273 0.233 0.189 0.176 0.261 0.221
[0.701] [0.721] [0.685] [0.735] [0.740] [0.761] [0.699] [0.749]
Presidential Control * Election Year -0.453 -0.467 -0.753 -0.713 -0.255 -0.252 -0.676 -0.630
[0.484] [0.486] [0.308] [0.356] [0.693] [0.707] [0.363] [0.417]
Box 2
Election Year in Established Democracy
2 0.619** 0.631** 0.725** 0.730** 0.679** 0.678** 0.718** 0.708**
[0.028] [0.027] [0.017] [0.018] [0.041] [0.045] [0.041] [0.049]
Election Year in New Democracy
2 -0.945* -0.817 -0.786 -0.741 -0.885 -0.773 -0.771 -0.746
[0.065] [0.118] [0.214] [0.254] [0.107] [0.168] [0.251] [0.278]
Presidential * Election Year 0.139 0.070 0.457 0.454 0.137 0.074 0.432 0.436
[0.800] [0.901] [0.526] [0.542] [0.803] [0.895] [0.549] [0.559]
Box 3
Election Year in Established Democracy
2 0.582* 0.625** 0.737** 0.795** 0.640* 0.673* 0.720* 0.767**
[0.054] [0.043] [0.032] [0.025] [0.063] [0.059] [0.054] [0.049]
Election Year in New Democracy
2 -0.912** -0.791* -0.586 -0.510 -0.854* -0.745 -0.590 -0.529
[0.035] [0.074] [0.260] [0.348] [0.068] [0.122] [0.290] [0.362]
Majoritarian * Election Year 0.254 0.073 0.219 0.013 0.244 0.066 0.218 0.015
[0.609] [0.883] [0.666] [0.980] [0.618] [0.894] [0.664] [0.977]
Box 4
Election Year in Established Democracy
2 0.542* 0.549* 0.698** 0.707** 0.632* 0.625* 0.716** 0.711*
[0.055] [0.056] [0.027] [0.028] [0.059] [0.067] [0.045] [0.052]
Election Year in New Democracy
2 -0.991** -0.911** -0.701 -0.674 -0.904* -0.837* -0.678 -0.667
[0.027] [0.047] [0.183] [0.222] [0.062] [0.094] [0.232] [0.260]
Vote_pres * Election Year -0.343 -0.335 -0.633* -0.644* -0.246 -0.232 -0.607* -0.619*
[0.273] [0.305] [0.056] [0.057] [0.425] [0.474] [0.063] [0.065]
Party_parl * Election Year -0.225 -0.165 -0.082 0.008 -0.139 -0.079 -0.050 0.032
[0.329] [0.512] [0.750] [0.978] [0.544] [0.754] [0.848] [0.909]
Box 5
Predetermined EY in Established Dem.
2 0.958*** 0.946*** 1.202*** 1.186*** 1.028*** 1.007** 1.193*** 1.166***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003] [0.008] [0.012] [0.005] [0.008]
Predetermined EY in New Democracy
2 -1.038** -1.005* -0.745 -0.774 -0.973* -0.949* -0.744 -0.784
[0.044] [0.055] [0.234] [0.231] [0.073] [0.086] [0.264] [0.249]
Eearly EY in Established Dem.
2 0.080 0.106 0.114 0.151 0.156 0.170 0.126 0.146
[0.825] [0.766] [0.771] [0.693] [0.688] [0.659] [0.764] [0.725]
Early EY in New Democracy
2 -0.626 -0.439 -0.223 -0.064 -0.543 -0.371 -0.193 -0.057
[0.319] [0.495] [0.769] [0.936] [0.413] [0.587] [0.806] [0.944]
*P values are in the parenthesis. The equations also included controls for cases where there was an additional leadership change in t, and the economic 
and political variables that appear in Table 5. The regressions in Box 4 also include the share of votes received by the president in a presidential system 
(the largest party's share of seats in parliament in a parliamentary system). *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively.
1 Indicates whether the equation included a control for expenditure growth.
2 An interaction between binary variables indicating whether the observation is an election year and whether the country belongs to the relavant category.
3 A binary variable with a value of 1 in a presidential system when the president's party is the largest party in government and in parliament.
Table 15: Election Year Effects on Changes in Expenditure Composition - Political Characteristics
Replaced Leader Replaced Leader in Election Year
Exp. Growth
1 No Exp. Growth
1 Exp. Growth





Our basic conclusion is that leaders can change the composition of government 
expenditure, but that change takes time. This no doubt reflects the combination of several 
factors: there is a learning process after taking office, including learning how to navigate the 37 
 
budget process; there are special interests who continue to push for the same programs under 
new leaders; and there are legislative or bureaucratic roadblocks that make change difficult.  
Perhaps this is not surprising – there is a learning curve for any activity, politics included. And, 
the competing interests that characterize politics make it extremely difficult to effect large 
changes in policy.  
What may be perhaps more surprising is how long it appears to take for leaders to 
significantly change the composition of government expenditure, three to four years in our data, 
and, what seems like the relatively small change attributable to a change in leadership –less than 
one percent in the four years after the change, relative to an overall composition change of eight 
to nine percent on average over four years. Or, perhaps this is not surprising, since major policy 
shifts or structural changes generally take many years to implement effectively. From a longer 
historical perspective, four years may not seem long.  
The length of time it takes and the magnitude of change has a clear implication for many 
countries, especially parliamentary democracies where governments may fall before the end of 
their full term: when government turnover is rapid, it is more likely to find that leaders have little 
effect on expenditure composition, rather than to observe chaotic changes. Even if the average 
tenure of governments is not very short, for example, two to three years, change in leaders may 
have little effect over time. The case of Israel is illustrative. Between 1996 and 2008 Israel had 
five election campaigns, four of which resulted in a leadership change. During that twelve-year 
period the 9 categories expenditure composition index changed by 6.7 percent – much less than 
the average 9% four-year change in the entire sample.
25 The common wisdom in Israel is that 
each government is coming in with its new reform agenda but by the time an action plan is ready 
the government is replaced so the status quo prevails. 
Our results cannot distinguish whether the relatively small and delayed effect of leaders on 
the composition of public expenditures is because they do not want to change it more and more 
quickly or because they cannot. We note however that where incentives may be especially large, 
for example in election years, leaders do tend to change the composition more than in other 
years. 
As we noted in the introduction, expenditure composition is only one measure of 38 
 
government policy and we cannot conclude whether our results on the effect of leaders hold true 
for other measures of policy. It is well worth exploring, but that requires construction of different 
datasets and a different paper. Our results suggest to us that the “null hypothesis” for the study of 
other broad policy measures is that leadership change has no significant effect on policy change 
in the near-term.  
And, as we further noted in the introduction, expenditure composition is an important 
aspect of policy in itself and changes in composition may indicate the direction of policy change 
in general. We hope that our results are another step in the complex question of how leaders 
matter for economic policy, as well as the question of how electoral incentives shape policy 
choices.   
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Leaders  1945‐2008  (http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00index2.htm)  and  World  Statesmen 
(http://www.worldstatesmen.org/).  Leader  identification  is  based  on  the  Presidential  variable, 
described below. In presidential systems the leader is the president and in parliamentary systems the 
leader is the prime‐minister. 
Information  on  election  dates  was  collected  from  the  Institute  for  Democracy  and  Electoral 
Assistance  (IDEA)  dataset
27  "Voter  Turnout  Since  1945"  and  supplemented  by  data  from  the  ERA 








Presidential  systems,  we  used  only  presidential  elections  and  in  Parliamentary  systems  only 










fiscal  years.  For  example,  in  Canada  the  fiscal  year  starts  on  April  1













several  of  the  expenditure  categories  we  use.  In  order  to  calculate  the  changes  in  expenditure 
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VOTE ‐  the  percent  of  votes  for  the  current  president  in  the  first  round  of  the  most  recent 
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government  and  opposition  and  provides  aggregate  information  regarding  all  other  parties  in 
government and opposition. 50 
 










Table A-1: Data Sources





IFS International Monetary 
Fund
2006 central government total expenditure 




GFS International Monetary 
Fund
2006 central government total expenditure, 





WDI The World Bank 2005 GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$, 






2003 Level of Democracy index 1800-2003
Database of Political 
Institutions
DPI The World Bank 2004 political system, term limits, election 
results and the allocation of seats in 
parliament, election system, political 
alignment.
1975-2004
Voter Turnout Since 1945 to 
Date
IDEA Institute for 
Democracy and 
Current election years, election results 1945-2006




Current election years, election results, 
election dates
1974-2004
Electionguide.org IFES International 
Foundation for 
Current election dates 1998-2005
World Political Leaders ZPC Zárate's Political 
Collections
Current leaders' names, dates of accession 
and their party association
1945-2008
The World Factbook CIA Central Intelligence 
Agency
Current election dates, frequency of elections 
in a country, political system
1960-2008
Worldstatesmen.org Ben M. Cahoon Current leaders' names, dates of accession, 




1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
Change in Expenditure Composition 7 9 4 1 5 7 3 0
Change in GDP Per Capita 3 9 7 9 3 9 7 9
Average Inflation  5 - - 14 4 - - 14
9 Expenditure Categories 12 Expenditure Categories
* The listed limitations are cumulative, therefore the number of observations dropped in each line assumes that 
observations that fail a previous constraint had already been dropped.
Table A-2: Numbers of Observations Dropped by Variable Limitation and Dataset *
 
 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
All Countries mean  4.473 6.317 7.747 7.926 5.144 7.105 8.577 8.754
stdev 3.890 4.778 5.764 5.030 4.352 5.185 6.089 5.431
Developed mean 2.958 4.267 5.370 5.811 3.196 4.664 5.672 6.256
stdev 2.602 2.943 3.824 3.511 2.446 3.085 3.410 3.417
Undeveloped mean 6.292 8.966 10.917 11.099 7.294 10.065 12.311 12.507
stdev 4.373 5.132 6.364 5.295 4.945 5.657 6.712 5.734
New Democracies mean  6.124 8.968 10.925 10.741 6.990 9.990 12.290 12.235
stdev 4.362 5.326 6.559 5.442 4.852 5.730 6.805 6.120
Established Democracies mean  3.701 5.330 6.506 7.073 4.277 5.918 7.179 7.779
stdev 3.385 3.964 4.895 4.572 3.802 4.433 5.150 4.795
Presidential mean 6.195 9.105 11.135 11.201 7.293 10.154 12.591 12.706
stdev 4.434 5.281 6.675 5.490 5.044 5.736 6.955 5.980
Parliamentary mean 3.686 5.204 6.294 6.665 4.129 5.771 6.856 7.290
stdev 3.333 3.870 4.624 4.214 3.562 4.296 4.735 4.394
Majoritarian mean 4.225 5.703 6.604 6.854 4.797 6.479 7.143 7.449
stdev 3.597 4.325 4.485 3.498 4.221 4.992 4.686 3.740
Proportional mean 4.539 6.599 8.030 8.209 5.252 7.294 8.992 9.164
stdev 3.964 4.793 6.007 5.328 4.389 5.231 6.381 5.805
9 Expenditure Categories 12 Expenditure Categories
1 The percentage change in Expenditure Composition within 9 or 12 categories during the period.
Table A-3: Descriptive Statistics of the Change in Expenditure Composition by Country 
Characteristics*
* For detailed information on the construction of the variables and definitions of country characteristics see the data 
appendix.





Table A-4: Majoritarian New Democracies in the Sample
Cat9_1 Cat9_2 Cat9_3 Cat9_4
Bangaladesh 2002-2003 2003 --
Chile 2002-2003 2003 --
Ethiopia 1996-1999 1997-1999 1998-1999 -
Iran 1998-2001 1999-2001 2000-2001 -
Malaysia 1973-1978 1974-1978 1975-1978 1976-1978
Mauritius 1981-1982 1982 - -
Mongolia 1993-1994, 1996-1998, 2001-2002 1994, 1997-1998, 2002  1997-1998 -
Nepal 1998-2001 1999-2001 2000-2001 2001
Thailand 1975, 1979-1990 1980-1988 1981-1988 1982-1989
Cat12_1 Cat12_2 Cat12_3 Cat12_4
Bangaladesh 2002-2003 2003 --
Chile 2002-2003 2003 --
Ethiopia 1996-1999 1997-1999 1998-1999 -
Iran 1998-2000 1999-2000 2000 -
Malaysia 1974-1975, 1978 1975, 1977 1977-1978 1977-1978
Mauritius 1981-1982 1982 - -
Mongolia 1993-1994, 1996-1998, 2001-2002 1994, 1997-1998, 2002  1997-1998 -
Nepal 1998-2001 1999-2001 2000-2001 2001
Thailand 1975, 1979-1990 1980-1988 1981-1988 1982-1989
9 Categories
12 Categories
 